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#2A-9/26/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 274, IAFF, WHITE PLAINS, 
Charging JParty, 
-and- CASE"NO. U-9419 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, 
Respondent. 
DE SOYE & REICH (THOMAS F. DE SOYE, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Professional Fire Fighters Association, Inc., Local 274, 
IAFF, White Plains (Local) and the cross-exceptions of the 
City of White Plains (City) to a decision of the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) which dismissed the Local's improper 
practice charge against the City. The charge alleges that 
the City violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it issued an 
unfavorable evaluation of John Sammartino, the Local's vice-
president, because of his exercise of representational rights 
granted by the Act. The Local's exceptions primarily 
challenge credibility determinations made by the Assistant 
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Director in crediting the testimony of Lieutenant Albert 
Brehmer, who wrote Sammartino's evaluation referencing an 
incident occurring prior to the evaluation. In particular, 
the Local alleges that the Assistant Director erred in 
"faiTing" t° find thatrsamimrtih^ 
evaluation because on or about July 24, 198 6, he investigated 
and made complaint about the handling by Brehmer of an 
incident in which fire fighter Kevin Heffernan sustained a 
burn injury while under Brehmer's supervision. The Local 
further alleges that a confrontation occurring between 
Sammartino and Brehmer on August 4, 1986, which occasioned 
the unfavorable evaluation later issued, was precipitated by 
Brehmer's animus toward Sammartino because of his 
participation in that protected union activity and by his 
reexamination on August 4 of Heffernan's burn injury. 
The City, for its part, cross-excepts to the Assistant 
Director's determination that Sammartino's August 4, 1986 
inquiry about Heffernan's burn was made as a union officer 
and constituted protected activity. 
At the outset, we find that the record more than 
adequately supports the Assistant Director's determination 
that Sammartino was engaged in protected union activity, and 
was acting in his capacity as a union officer, when, on 
August 4, 1986, he made inquiry about fire fighter 
Heffernan's burn injury, which had not been referred to a 
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hospital in accordance with departmental policy. Sammartino 
testified, without contradiction, that he first made inquiry 
on or about July 24, 1986, about the burn injury after 
receiving complaints from several fire fighters who witnessed 
the incident that Heffernan had hot~ been' sent to^a doctor 6iF 
to a hospital and after these fire fighters asked Sammartino 
what the Local intended to do about it. Further, the City's 
own internal memorandum describing the results of the 
investigation of Sammartino's complaint is entitled "Union 
complaint on burn injury at the Drill School." Based upon 
the foregoing, there can be no doubt that Sammartino was 
acting in his capacity as a union officer in making inquiry 
and complaint about the incident. There can also be no doubt 
that Sammartino's request to Heffernan, on August 4, 198 6, to 
examine the burn injury (which was granted) was in connection 
with the complaint concerning the handling of the injury by 
Brehmer and constituted protected activity. The City's 
cross-exceptions are accordingly denied. 
The Assistant Director's dismissal of the charge rests 
primarily upon credibility determinations made by him 
concerning the testimony of Sammartino and Brehmer about the 
events of August 4, 1986. In essence, the Local asserts that 
an exchange of hostile words took place between the two 
following Brehmer's observation of Sammartino examining 
Heffernan's burn injury and Sammartino's advising Brehmer 
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that he was acting in his capacity as a union official. 
Brehmer testified, to the contrary, that he did not observe 
Sammartino looking at Heffernan's burn, and that Sammartino 
never informed him that he was acting as a union official. 
The "Assistant"' "Director"' "credited" Brehmer * s testimony "that the 
confrontation between himself and Sammartino took place as a 
result of Sammartino's "sarcastic" questions to him 
concerning the manner in which the drill was to be conducted 
on August 4, and not because of Sammartino's protected 
activity. He therefore found that the evaluation issued by 
Brehmer on January 18, 1987 was not prompted by anti-union 
animus. 
It is uncontroverted that Sammartino and Brehmer had a 
long history of friction between them, which preceded 
Sammartino's involvement in employee organizational activity. 
i/The evaluation reads in its entirety as follows: "I 
haven't work(sic) with John but once at Drill School. He did 
only what he was told to do and tried to disrupt the class. 
After things were straightened out he did his job. I would 
not want to work (sic) or have him in my company." The 
Association excepts to the Assistant Director's crediting of 
Brehmer's testimony that he wrote evaluations of other fire 
fighters, in addition to Sammartino, whom he supervised for 
one day only, claiming that the City had the burden of 
producing documentary evidence to support this testimony and 
that upon its failure to do so, the testimony was entitled to 
no weight. We disagree. The burden rested with the 
Association to challenge Brehmer's credibility, by offering 
differing or conflicting evidence. Because Brehmer's 
testimony was unrebutted in this regard, the Assistant 
Director properly drew no inference of anti-union animus from 
Brehmer's issuance of an evaluation of Sammartino based upon 
one day's contact. 
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Indeed, when, in April 1986, Brehmer was served with internal 
union disciplinary charges by the Local, he struck 
Sammartino's name from the list of the members of the 
Executive Board to be convened to hear the charges against 
him because he considered SammaTrtiho~~"to" be "ah excitable 
individual, biased, in my opinion." 
This history of personal animosity between Brehmer and 
Sammartino, together with the Assistant Director's 
credibility determinations that Brehmer was unaware of any 
involvement by Sammartino in the investigation or complaint 
by the Local concerning Heffernan's burn injury prior to 
August 4, or of his examination of the injury on August 4, 
constitutes a sufficient basis upon which the Assistant 
Director could properly conclude that the confrontation of 
August 4, 1986 was not caused or occasioned by Sammartino's 
protected activity. He therefore properly found that the 
evaluation subsequently issued on January 18, 1987 
constituted nothing more than a reflection of that 
unprotected confrontation. 
While the proximity in time of Sammartino's complaint to 
Brehmer's supervisor concerning Brehmer"s handling of the 
burn injury, together with the opportunity which Brehmer had 
to either observe or hear Sammartino making inquiry 
concerning Heffernan's injury on August 4, established the 
existence of a prima facie case of retaliation for protected 
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activity, the credibility determinations made by the 
Assistant Director that Brehmer neither knew about 
Sammartino *s prior complaint nor observed or heard him making 
inquiry about the injury on August 4 constitute a rebuttal of 
the prima.faci^^ evidence, and will hot ber disturbed~byr us. "" 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Assistant 
Director is affirmed and it is hereby ordered that the charge 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Lu~+4>c~ 2? 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2B-9/26/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHAMPTON TOWN PUBLIC SAFETY DISPATCHERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO - C-3399 
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
Employer, 
-and-
SOUTHAMPTON TOWN UNIT OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO, ESQS. (REYNOLD A. MAURO, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Petitioner 
BERNARD TEICHMAN, ESQ., for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Southampton Town Public Safety Dispatchers Benevolent 
Association (Association) to the dismissal by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) of 
its petition seeking its certification as the exclusive 
bargaining agent for a unit of 15 employees of the Town of 
Board - C-3399 
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Southampton (Town)-^/ in the titles of Public Safety 
Dispatcher I, Public Safety Dispatcher II, and Senior Public 
Safety Dispatcher (Dispatcher). The Dispatchers are 
currently represented by the Southampton Town Unit of the 
"Civil Service Employees""Association, Inc. "(CSEA) , ~ in a unit 
of approximately 2 00 Town employees. 
2/ 
As we have previously held,-2-/ we will not disturb long-
standing units^/ in the absence of compelling evidence of the 
need to do so, which is established by proving either the 
existence of a conflict of interest or inadequate 
representation. The Association's exceptions relate 
primarily to its claim that the Director failed to give 
sufficient weight to evidence of either a conflict of 
interest between Dispatchers and others in the CSEA unit or 
of inadequate representation of the Dispatchers by CSEA. 
The Association appears to allege that a conflict of 
interest exists between Dispatchers and other unit employees 
because Dispatchers are the only shift employees in the CSEA 
i/The Town opposes the petition upon the ground of 
administrative convenience, but has not appeared on this 
appeal. 
—/There is one other unit of employees, which consists of 
police officers. 
-2-/See, e.g. , State of New York (Long Island Park, 
Recreational and Historical Preservation Commission), 2 2 PERB 
53043 (1989), and cases cited therein at footnote 2. 
^-/cSEA's unit has been in existence for approximately 16 
years. 
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unit, because they wear uniforms, and because they report to 
the Chief of Police. While these factors constitute some 
differences in conditions of employment between Dispatchers 
and others in the unit, the existence of such differences 
amongruMtmeniba^ does not r^olie"-e^ tab^ isTi"'""t3re-exi"sl^ nce'"'''of 
a conflict of interest. The question before us, then, is not 
whether differences exist, but whether these differences rise 
to the level of a conflict of interest warranting the 
fragmentation of Dispatchers from their existing unit. 
The Association's exceptions, which point out these 
differences in terms and conditions of employment, make no 
references to anything in the record which would support a 
) finding that a conflict exists. The unique characteristics 
of shift work, uniform use, and reporting to the Chief of 
Police fail to establish a per se conflict of interest with 
other unit members. This finding, combined with the evidence 
that at least some contractual accommodation of the 
specialized working conditions of Dispatchers has been made 
in the collective negotiation process between CSEA and the 
Town, warrants affirmance of the Director's finding that a 
conflict of interest between the Dispatchers and the CSEA 
unit has not been established. 
The second primary assertion made by the Association in 
its exceptions is that the record supports a finding that 
CSEA has inadequately represented Dispatchers and that the 
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Director failed to give appropriate weight to the record in 
this regard. 
In support of its claim, the Association asserts that 
unit meetings are extremely infrequent, that posting of 
meet ings at "the' porice~ depaf tment" is not adequately assured, 
because notices of meetings are forwarded by CSEA to the 
secretary to the Chief of Police for posting, and that CSEA 
has failed to establish and maintain regular contact with the 
shop steward representing the Dispatchers, and further, has 
failed to conduct training programs for the Dispatchers' shop 
steward. 
It is our finding that however much increased 
communication and participation is to be encouraged, the 
record does not establish inadequate representation of the 
Dispatchers in particular, so as to warrant their 
fragmentation from the CSEA unit. Indeed, there is no claim 
or evidence that Dispatchers are treated any differently than 
other unit personnel. In the absence of evidence that 
representation of the particular titles which are the subject 
of the fragmentation petition has been inadequate when 
compared to representation of others in the existing unit, we 
will deny fragmentation. 
Board - C-3 399 
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We have reviewed the remaining exceptions of the 
Association and find them to be without merit. 
5/ 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Director 
dismissing the petition is affirmed, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that th~e pet it iron be, and it" "hereby is, dismissed "in its 
entirety. 
DATED: September 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^- Sjje^j-^u <g^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
§JAmong its exceptions, the Association states that the 
Director improperly described the Town's opposition to the 
petition as creating "an intolerable administrative burden" 
upon it. While we agree with the Association that the extent 
of the Town's opposition is "administrative inconvenience", 
the Director's characterization of the extent of the Town's 
opposition does not affect the outcome here. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ., for Petitioner 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ. (LEONARD R. KERSHAW, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By nine petitions filed on August 31, 1987, the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (Petitioner) seeks to add the currently unrepresented 
title of Family Court Hearing Examiner (Examiner) to nine 
existing negotiating units represented by it of nonjudicial 
employees of the State of New York - Unified Court System 
(Employer). Initially, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed the 
petitions upon the ground that Examiners are potentially 
subject to the requirements of Canon 7 of the State Code of 
Judicial Conduct (Code) (which directs judges to refrain from 
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political activity inappropriate to their judicial office-^ / 
(21 PERB f4072 (1988)). The Board, upon review, reversed the 
Director's decision and found that, notwithstanding the 
potential applicability of Canon 7 of the Code, there is no 
statutory basis upon which it could be said that Examiners 
are excluded from coverage under the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) solely by virtue of the applicability of 
the Code to them in whole or in part (22 PERB f3022 (1989)). 
We remanded the petitions to the Director for further 
proceedings and issuance of a uniting decision. It is that 
particular, Canon 7 of the Code prohibits the following: 
A. Political Conduct In General 
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to a 
judicial office should not: 
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a 
political organization; 
(b) make speeches for a political organization or 
candidate or publicly endorse a candidate for 
public office; 
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make 
a contribution to a political organization or 
candidate, attend political gatherings, or purchase 
tickets for political party dinners, or other 
functions, except as authorized in subsection A(2); 
(2) The judge holding an office filled by public 
election between competing candidates, or a candidate 
for such office, may, only insofar as permitted by law, 
attend political gatherings, speak to such gatherings on 
s own bel iaj.jL Wij.en he is a C3nuiuai.s ior cxSCuion or 
reelection, identify himself as a member of a political 
party, and contribute to a political party or 
organization . . . . 
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political 
activity except on behalf of measures to improve the 
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. 
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Director's decision which is now before us upon the 
Employer's exceptions challenging the placement of the 
Examiners in the nine existing units currently represented by 
Petitioner. 
The Employer asserts in its exceptions, first, that the 
Examiners do not share a community of interest with employees 
in the nine negotiating units, and second, that the Director 
failed to take into consideration the requirements of 
§207.1(c) of the Act, which requires PERB to take into 
account the compatibility of the unit with the joint 
responsibilities of the public employer and the public 
employees to serve the public when defining appropriate 
negotiating units. We will address each of these claims in 
turn. 
With respect to the allegation that the Examiners do not 
share a community of interest with employees in the nine 
negotiating units to which the Director has ordered their 
addition, the Employer alleges first that the position of 
Examiner, together with the duties and requirements for 
appointment, are fixed by §43 9 of the Family Court Act 
(Chapter 809, Section 14 of the Laws of 1985), and that these 
statutory requirements create significant differences between 
the Examiners and employees in the existing units. In 
particular, the Employer points out that Examiners are the 
only nonjudicial employees having the authority to hear and 
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determine matters with binding effect upon litigants, that 
Examiners are appointed for renewable three-year terms, that 
they are quasi-judicial officers subject to the Code, and 
that, by virtue of the applicability of the Code to them, 
their placement in units represented by Petitioner, which is 
an organization that supports political candidates and 
engages in other political activity, would place them in 
jeopardy of violation of Canon 7 (A) of the Code. However, 
as the Director found in the prior proceedings before him (21 
PERB f4072, at 4123, n. 5), at least two other unit 
positions, i.e., Law Clerks to Supreme Court Judges and Law 
Assistant-Referees, are quasi-judicial in nature, and 
incumbents may conference cases, resolve uncontested issues, 
conduct hearings, swear witnesses, take testimony, and report 
findings of fact to judges. The fact that Examiners are 
quasi-judicial officers whose duties are outlined in the 
Judiciary Law is an insufficient basis for a determination 
that they do not share a community of interest with other 
quasi-judicial officers currently in units represented by 
Petitioner and who are performing substantially similar 
tasks. 
^The Employer contends that the binding nature of certain 
Examiner decisions, subject to review by a Family Court 
Judge, makes Examiners significantly different from other 
quasi-judicial officers. No explanation is offered, however, 
why this difference has a bearing upon the community of 
interest of these employees with respect to the terms and 
conditions of their employment. 
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Also, we do not find persuasive the Employer's claim 
that because Examiners are appointed to renewable three-year 
terms their exclusion from the existing units is warranted. 
Indeed, it is commonplace that units consist of employees who 
hold positions having a wide range of appointment and tenure 
rights. These include persons whose employment is temporary, 
provisional, probationary, permanent, competitive class or 
noncompetitive class. We have not regarded these 
differences, which affect not only their term of employment, 
but the conditions of their employment with respect to due 
process requirements, as a basis for the creation of separate 
units, nor is there such a basis here. 
The two final arguments made by the Employer in 
opposition to the addition of Examiners to existing units 
both relate to the fact that Petitioner, in addition to its 
traditional collective bargaining functions, engages in 
political activity, and that placement of Examiners in units 
represented by Petitioner is therefore inappropriate by 
virtue of Canon 7. 
As we held in our earlier, decision in this matter, the Act, 
which it is our duty to administer, affords no authorization to 
make uniting decisions on the basis of the nature and lawful 
activities of the particular employee organization representing a 
unit at a particular point in time. Section 207.1 of the Act 
establishes three specific standards to be considered in 
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determining the appropriateness of units. These standards relate 
to the composition of the units themselves and not to the 
bargaining agents for those units. We decline to add a criterion 
to the standards for uniting decisions which has not been 
statutorily authorized, particularly where, as here, the 
Legislature could readily have determined to exclude Examiners 
from coverage under the Act by the simple expedient of adding 
Examiners to the list of titles specifically excluded from the 
Act's coverage at §201.7(a) at the time it enacted Chapter 809 of 
the Laws of 1985. We must assume that the Legislature's failure 
to enact this exclusion is properly construed to mean that 
Examiners should not be excluded from coverage, notwithstanding 
the fact that virtually every public employee organization 
representing employees of public employers under the Act engages 
in activity which may be construed as "political". 
While we fully recognize the Employer's concern that 
Examiners who join or are represented by an employee organization 
which engages in political activity may potentially run afoul of 
the Code, this concern is no more applicable to Examiners than to 
other quasi-judicial officers now represented in units-3-/, and, as 
3-/For example, in addition to the other quasi-judicial employees 
in the Employer's units here, large numbers of administrative law 
judges employed by the State of New York in various departments 
and agencies perform quasi-judicial functions and are represented 
in bargaining units. 
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we have held, it is not a criterion which we are authorized to 
consider.4/ 
Based upon the foregoing, and the findings previously made 
in our prior decision, we find that a sufficient community of 
interest exists between the Examiners and employees in the units 
now represented by Petitioner to warrant their addition to such 
units. The Employer's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the Director adding these employees to the respective units and 
calling for elections is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Examiner positions are 
added to the negotiating units listed as follows: 
Case No. Unit 
C-3276 — Putnam County 
C-3277 — Dutchess County 
C-3278 — Orange County 
C-3279 — Eighth Judicial District 
C-3280 — Seventh Judicial District 
C-3281 — Sixth Judicial District 
C-3 282 — Fifth Judicial District 
C-3283 — Fourth Judicial District 
C-3284 — Third Judicial District 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded to 
the Director for election by secret ballot to be held under 
his supervision among the employees in each unit determined 
above to be appropriate who were employed on the payroll date 
4/We note that the Director found, 21 PERB f4072, at 4123 n. 9, 
that the Petitioner's bylaws provide that the employees it 
represents, whether dues payers or agency fee payers, may obtain 
a refund of so much of such dues or fees as are used for 
political purposes is a finding to which no exception has been 
taken and which we deem not to be in issue (Rules §201.12). This 
being so, conflict with the Code may be avoidable in any event. 
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immediately preceding the date of this decision and order, 
unless the Petitioner submits to the Director, within 15 days 
from the date of receipt of this decision and order, evidence 
to satisfy the requirements of §2 01.9(g)(1) of the Rules for 
certification without election; ~"~ 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employer shall submit to 
the Director and to the Petitioner, within 15 days from the 
date of receipt of this decision and order, an alphabetized 
list of all employees within each unit determined above to be 
appropriate who were employed on the payroll date immediately 
preceding the date of this decision and order. 
DATED: September 26, 19 8 9 
Albany, New York 
<Mu*a&&Ab /j&Ltr-2!&*&-<«_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2D-9/26/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
PORT JERVIS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, pro se 
HENRY J. HOLLEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Port Jervis City School District (District) excepts 
to an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision which finds 
that the District violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on November 7, 8, 
and 10, 1988, it denied written requests made by John Thomas 
McAndrew for paid personal business leave to appear before 
this Board to prosecute two separate improper practice 
charges against his union. 
In its exceptions, the District asserts that paid 
personal business leave constitutes a contractual benefit 
which is within its discretion to deny, and that McAndrew has 
failed to meet his burden of proving that its exercise of the 
discretion to deny paid personal leave was improperly 
motivated within the meaning of the Act. 
CASE NO. U-10493 
Board - U-10493 
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It is certainly true that the District has, pursuant to 
its collective bargaining agreement with McAndrew's 
bargaining agent, the discretion to deny paid personal 
business leave (which is available for, among other things, 
~ "legal" matters' pertaining to the teacher or his/her immediate 
family"), if the grant of such leave would "disrupt District 
operations". However, the District received paid personal 
business leave requests for a total of 843 days during the 
period January 1986 to April 1989. Of these requests, aside 
from McAndrew's, only four were denied, and, according to 
District Superintendent Moscati, they were denied because the 
employees had not been employed for a sufficient period of 
) time to be eligible for personal business leave or for 
similar reasons. 
Moscati testified that McAndrew's paid personal business 
leave requests were denied because the taking of leave by him 
would be disruptive of District operations, particularly 
because McAndrew had, on other occasions in the pursuit of 
improper practice charges before this Board, subpoenaed 
numerous District employees, whose absence from work caused 
disruption. Notwithstanding this testimony, Moscati 
testified that he would have given McAndrew unpaid leave to 
prosecute his improper practice charges on the days 
requested. From the testimony that McAndrew's absence from 
work would have been authorized, if unpaid, the ALJ concluded 
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that the explanation offered for the denial of paid business 
leave, i.e., concern about disruption of District operations, 
was pretextual. Finding the District's explanation to be 
pretextual, the ALJ inferred that improper motivation was the 
basis for the denial of paid leave. Indeed, theAEJ ^ 
concluded that the willingness of the District to grant leave 
for the days but its unwillingness to pay McAndrew for the 
days in question constitutes affirmative evidence of the 
District's attempt to interfere with, restrain and coerce 
McAndrew in the exercise of his right to file and prosecute 
improper practice charges. 
It is our determination that the ALJ decision carefully 
and clearly reserves to the District the contractual 
discretion to deny requests for paid personal business leave, 
while finding that the exercise of that discretion may not be 
motivated by an intent to interfere with the exercise of 
rights protected by the Act. 
Notwithstanding the exceptions of the District, we find 
that McAndrew met his burden of presenting a prima facie case 
of unlawful interference upon presentation of evidence of the 
granting of paid personal business leave requests, regardless 
of the nature of the business involved, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases within the District, which shifted the 
burden of going forward to the District to establish the 
existence of a legitimate business reason for its action. 
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The District's explanation that McAndrew's use of paid 
personal business leave time would disrupt its operations was 
properly found by the ALT to be pretextual, based upon the 
fact that the District was prepared to, and did, offer unpaid 
•-"leave- to McAndrew forthedays in question, which, if 
accepted, would have resulted in precisely the same degree of 
disruption of District operations as would have occurred if 
paid leave had been granted. The only difference between 
the grant of unpaid leave versus paid leave to McAndrew lies 
in the expense to him of prosecuting his charges before this 
Board. 
Based upon the foregoing, and upon the findings and 
analysis set forth in the ALT decision, the District's 
exceptions are denied in their entirety, and we find that the 
District violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act by denying 
McAndrew's requests for paid personal business leave made on 
November 7, 8, and 10, 1988. We affirm the remedial portion 
of the ALT decision, together with the reasoning contained 
therein, which were not the subject of any exceptions by 
McAndrew. 1/ 
•i/we note in this regard that because McAndrew refused to 
avail himself of unpaid leave in order to attend the hearing 
scheduled before this Board, the charges filed by him were 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Port Jervis 
Teachers Association, 22 PERB [^3021 (1989) . Further, because 
he elected not to take any leave at all to attend the 
hearing, an award of back pay is not justified in this case. 
Board - U-10493 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, coercing or 
restraining McAndrew in the exercise of his rights 
protected by the Act, and 
2. Sign and post the attached"notice at all locations 
customarily used to post communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: September 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
/Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
w 7 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APKKDIX 
1ICE10 DLL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
«r*d In ord»r tc •ff»etu»t» th» pollclM of th» 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
»• h»r»by notify all members of the unit represented by the Port Jervis 
Teachers Association that the Port Jervis Public Schools will not 
interfere with, coerce or restrain John Thomas McAndrew in the 
exercise of his rights protected by the Act. 






 (MprMtniitlvt) (TVtH) 
This Notice must remain posted tor 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be alterec 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#3A-9/26/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKLAND COUNTY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3067 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer, 
-and-
ROCKLAND COUNTY UNIT, ROCKLAND COUNTY 




ROCKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
Certification - C-3067 page 2 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Rockland County Sheriff's 
Deputies Association, Inc. has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
~~"excIus"ive~repre"se'ntative""'"for"~t"h"e purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the Sheriff's Department. 
Excluded: All ranks in the Sheriff's Patrol above the 
rank of Patrol Sergeant; all other employees 
whose titles are included in another unit or by 
Resolution #612 of 1972 as amended. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Rockland County Sheriff's 
Deputies Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
/ Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eise 
/ \ /Ltr-ttu^^/ 
iberg, Membe 
